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RESPONSE OF JOHN KULEWICZ TO PROFESSOR SHANKER
by
JOHN J. KULEWICZ*
A glaring error in Professor Shanker's recent article proves the value of the
parol evidence rule at least as effectively as the balance of his scholarly contribution
to this journal. In reviewing the arguments of counsel in the Marion PCA v. Cochran
case,' Professor Shanker claims that the Court "was led astray by the lawyers" and
that" [m]isleading from the [l]awyers" caused the Court to undertake its analysis of
the Statute of Frauds.2 He stakes this claim on his apparent belief that counsel did
not ask the Court to apply the parol evidence rule to the facts of the case. By sub-
jecting a definitive written text -- the brief of appellant Marion PCA -- to his own
extrinsic assumptions, it is Professor Shanker who has gone astray.
The Supreme Court, at the urging of the Marion PCA, directly considered the
parol evidence issue. I served as counsel to the Marion PCA and, in that capacity,
wrote its brief. On pages 23 through 25 of the brief, under the sub-heading "Parol
Evidence Rule," the Marion PCA made the following argument:
Count One of the counterclaim also is legally insufficient because
its proof would depend upon admission of the alleged Marion PCA
promise into evidence to vary or contradict the written terms of the
agreement of the Cochrans. Because of the parol evidence rule, no Ohio
court could allow such proof. In Burton, Inc. v. Durkee, 158 Ohio St.
313 (1952), this Court ruled that:
Where parties, following negotiations, make mutual prom-
ises which thereafter are integrated into an unambiguous
written contract, duly signed by them, the parol evidence rule
excludes from consideration evidence as to other promises
resulting from such negotiations.
The notes and mortgage attached to the complaint as Exhibits A,
B and E (the execution and delivery of which the Cochrans admitted),
and Exhibit I attached to the Cochran counterclaim are the unambiguous
written agreement between the parties. (J.R. at 13-14, 19-22, 34-36.)
The alleged oral agreement would vary or contradict that agreement. As
J.D. 1979, Yale Law School; B.A. 1976, Ohio State University; Partner, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and
Pease.
40 Ohio St. 3d 265 (1988).
2 See Shanker, Judicial Misuses of the Word Fraud to Defeat the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of
Frauds (With Some Cheers and Jeers for the Ohio Supreme Court), 23 AKRON L. REV. 1, 11 (1989).
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such it would be inadmissible. There is no other basis for Count One of
the Cochran counterclaim.
Indeed, the parol evidence rule, as one commentator has noted,
provides that "when two parties have made a contract and have
expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the
complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether
parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will
not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing."
3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 573 (1963). "Consideration of the circum-
stances surrounding a contract," as another commentator has observed,
"is not for the purpose of varying the intention of the parties, as
disclosed by the writing, but for the purpose of ascertaining what the
parties, in fact, meant by the doubtful language employed for the
expression of their intention." 18 0. Jur. 3d Contracts § 162 (1980 &
Cum. Supp. 1987). See also Id. at § 163 ("where the contract is plain
and unambiguous, it is not error to refuse to admit evidence as to the
negotiations which led up the execution of the contract"); 3 A. Corbin,
Contracts § 573 (1963) ("if the parties have stated the terms of their
contract in the form of a complete written integration, it cannot be varied
or contradicted by proof of antecedent negotiations and agreements").
Courts have recognized that the parol evidence rule specifically
bars guarantor claims for fraudulent inducement based upon oral
statements that would vary or contradict the written terms of the
guaranty agreement. See, e.g., U.S. v. Willard E. Fraser Co., 308 F.
Supp. 557, 562-63 (D. Mont. 1970), affd 459 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1972)
(parol evidence rule bars consideration of oral statements upon which
fraudulent inducement claim based); Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co.,
261 Minn. 26, 110 N.W. 2d 484 (1961) ("[p]arol evidence is not
admissible to contradict the express terms of a written agreement.... As
a matter of law, plaintiffs' fraud claims cannot be sustained"); Marx v.
Schwartz, 14 Or. 177, 12 P. 253 (1886) (alleged oral representations
"became merged in the writing itself when it was executed, and must
be held to contain the entire agreement between the parties at the time").
The Marion PCA also raised the questions, of course, of: (1) whether Ohio law
allows a claim for fraud based upon a promise that is unenforceable under the Statute
of Frauds; (2) whether, because the parties to a contract are presumed to know the
law, one justifiably can rely on a promise that is void under the Statute of Frauds; (3)
whether Ohio law allows a claim for fraud based upon a promise of future
performance; and (4) whether Ohio law allows a claim for fraud in the inducement
by one who has failed to return the consideration that he or she received in the
transaction.
[Vol. 23:3
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The Court chose to explain its decision in terms of the Statute of Frauds and
-- in my own assessment -- reached a sound result. When he claims that the Statute
of Frauds issue was the only question that the Court considered, however, Professor
Shanker unfairly impugns the conscientiousness of the Court and considerably
understates the efforts of counsel. The Ohio Supreme Court knew what it was
writing about when it reviewed the arguments of counsel in the Marion PCA case.
Professor Shanker, with all due respect, did not.
REPLY OF MORRIS G. SHANKER TO JOHN J. KULEWICZ
March 27, 1990
Dear Mr. Kulewicz:
I acknowledge your letter of March 19 with enclosures. The statements in your
brief came as a complete surprise to me.
Nothing in the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion indicated that the litigants had
raised the Parol Evidence Rule, or that it was an issue in the case. To the contrary,
on the matter which is the subject of my article, the Court throughout its opinion
indicates that the only issue before it is one involving the Statute of Frauds; more
particularly, whether PCA could raise the Statute of Frauds by way of a late filed
reply and, if so, whether it was a meritorious defense to defendants' counterclaims.
Thus, Justice Kerns writes:
"The only issue of any consequence in this appeal is essentially one of
pleading--whether the Statute of Frauds is a complete defense ..... " P.
276.
Comparably, the majority opinion in the factual statement states that:
"... PCA thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the
basis that the Statute of Frauds bars the relief requested therein [by
defendants]." P. 269.
The Court then notes that the appeal it was deciding arose when the trial court
"... determined that PCA's motion to dismiss was well taken in that the Statute of
Frauds is a legal bar to the action." P. 269. Comparably, in its analysis, the Court
states that the issue for its consideration was "... . whether the Cochran's remaining
counterclaim was properly dismissed by the trial court on the pleadings pursuant to
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PCA's motion based on the ground that the counterclaim is barred by Ohio Statute
of Frauds." P. 272. And, at page 273: "PCA's defense to this counterclaim is that
this action is barred by the Statute of Frauds .... " Further, headnotes 2, 3, and 4
each expressly state that only the Statute of Frauds was being considered and
decided.
In writing my article, I relied upon what was contained in the Supreme Court's
opinion which several times indicates that PCA's motion was based on the Statute
of Frauds. Thus, your letter advising that your brief also raised issues on the Parol
Evidence Rule came as a quite a surprise.
You are entitled to a correction from me. Based on the information you have
now supplied to me, anything in my article which infers or suggests that you had not
mentioned or raised the Parol Evidence Rule to the Court is factually inaccurate and
I apologize for it. Indeed, I compliment you for having raised the Parol Evidence
issue since, as my article makes clear, I believe it was the controlling legal principle
for this case.
For the reasons stated in my article, I do not agree with your assessment in your
Response that the Ohio Supreme Court "reached a sound result" with respect the
Statute of Frauds. Nevertheless, to help set the record straight, I would join with your
request to the Akron Law Review that they publish your Response. They also have
my permission to publish at the same time this letter.
Morris G. Shanker
John Homer Kapp, Professor of Law
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